War Hurts Us All

By Austin Headrick American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)

War hurts us all. It always has. As President Dwight Eisenhower said nearly three years into the Korean War, “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.” The millions of Koreans who experienced the destructive costs of the Korean War know this truth acutely. Seventy-six years later, the cost—in lives and dollars—spent on that war has not produced peace for Koreans. Today, the billions of dollars and thousands of lives taken by the U.S. and Israel’s illegal war against Iran will not produce peace for the people of Iran or the rest of the world. We must use our voice to say no to more wars. This war is illegal On February 27, 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched airstrikes on cities across Iran, killing Iranian leader Ali Khamenei and hundreds of civilians. Just one day earlier, Oman's foreign minister had announced a diplomatic breakthrough: Iran had agreed to stop stockpiling enriched uranium and to accept full verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An agreement was within reach. Talks were scheduled to resume on March 2. Then the United States and Israel began a war without Congressional approval. The IAEA confirmed there was no evidence of Iran building a nuclear bomb and urged the return to diplomacy and negotiations. This war did not happen because diplomacy failed. It happened because the U.S. abandoned diplomacy. The war against Iran is illegal under both U.S. and international law and opposed by most people in the United States. President Trump bypassed Congress and began this war without authorization—an executive war-making precedent set by Truman at the start of the Korean War. In 1950, Truman sent U.S. troops to Korea without a congressional declaration of war, calling it a "police action" rather than a war. That decision cost 3 million lives and set a precedent that presidents have since used to wage war without the consent of the American people or their representatives. Trump is following the same playbook—and the consequences, as Koreans know too well, can last for decades. The Trump administration's disregard for the rule of law endangers all of us. The war costs too much Koreans are already paying for this war through reduced crude oil imports, historic stock market drops, and rising grocery bills, heating bills, and gas prices. On top of this, the U.S. has taken the THAAD missile defense system—the system that cost Korea $7.5 billion in economic damage when China retaliated in 2017—out of Korea and redeployed it to the Middle East to fight a war Koreans never asked for Among the administration's claims justifying the attacks against Iran was the need to intervene following the Iranian government's killing of thousands of its own citizens in the streets in January. Such horrific state violence is abhorrent. As a Quaker advocate of peace, I mourn this loss of life. I must hold two truths in tension: that the Iranian regime committed brutal acts, and this war is illegal and catastrophic. The Trump administration's claims about helping the Iranian people fall flat when the U.S. government is dropping bombs on over 600 Iranian schools and hospitals and the President is threatening that "a whole civilization will die" in Iran. In five weeks, U.S. and Israeli strikes have killed over 1600 civilians and displaced millions of people. Bombing Iranian civilians does not help people—it kills them. Koreans have seen this story unfold before. An estimated 3 million people, approximately 20 percent of the population on the Korean Peninsula, were killed in the Korean War. American bombers targeted "everything that moved in North Korea, every brick standing on top of another," according to senior State Department official Dean Rusk. Both Koreas were left in devastation and destitution. The Korean War has cost the U.S. and South Korea over a trillion dollars over the past 76 years. South Korea spends $1 billion annually just to host 28,500 U.S. troops. Now we hear the Pentagon tell Congress that the first week of the Iran war cost more than $11.3 billion, then requested $200 billion more from American taxpayers. Trump then requested warships from South Korea and other allies (though he was dissatisfied with their response). All that money spent on war has not and will not bring peace—not to Korea nor to Iran. War takes resources away from caring for the elderly, educating children, housing families, and providing infrastructure. No one wins in war because war hurts us all. What we can do Sixty-one percent of people in the U.S. oppose the war against Iran. This is the most unpopular U.S. war has ever been at its inception. In South Korea, 55 percent oppose their government's support of the war, and 89 percent worry the war will continue. This is an opportunity to turn opposition into action. Because Koreans are bearing many costs from this war, they have justification to urge their government to refuse further involvement and support an end to the war. The National Assembly has constitutional authority over overseas military deployments. Civil society can advocate that lawmakers exercise that authority by standing firm that there will be no Korean naval deployment to the Strait of Hormuz and no transfer of Korean-made weapons systems to countries participating in this war. Spain has given a powerful example of what principled refusal looks like by denying the U.S. use of its military bases and closing its airspace to U.S. aircraft involved in strikes against Iran, even under threat of trade retaliation. South Korea can and should follow that example. Civil society must ask for more than refusal, they must call for peace. A fragile two-week ceasefire was reached on April 8, but it is already at risk of collapse. We must all call on our elected leaders to support a permanent ceasefire. How many more lives and how much more money are we willing to spend on a legacy of wars that prove, time and again, that war hurts us all? ※Austin Headrick is the Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for Asia at American Friends Service Committee. Prior to joining AFSC, Austin lived in South Korea for seven years, working on peace education. Austin obtained an MA in Korean Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul.

© 2026 Korean Sharing Movement. All rights reserved.

War Hurts Us All

By Austin Headrick American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)

War hurts us all. It always has. As President Dwight Eisenhower said nearly three years into the Korean War, “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.” The millions of Koreans who experienced the destructive costs of the Korean War know this truth acutely. Seventy-six years later, the cost—in lives and dollars—spent on that war has not produced peace for Koreans. Today, the billions of dollars and thousands of lives taken by the U.S. and Israel’s illegal war against Iran will not produce peace for the people of Iran or the rest of the world. We must use our voice to say no to more wars. This war is illegal On February 27, 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched airstrikes on cities across Iran, killing Iranian leader Ali Khamenei and hundreds of civilians. Just one day earlier, Oman's foreign minister had announced a diplomatic breakthrough: Iran had agreed to stop stockpiling enriched uranium and to accept full verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An agreement was within reach. Talks were scheduled to resume on March 2. Then the United States and Israel began a war without Congressional approval. The IAEA confirmed there was no evidence of Iran building a nuclear bomb and urged the return to diplomacy and negotiations. This war did not happen because diplomacy failed. It happened because the U.S. abandoned diplomacy. The war against Iran is illegal under both U.S. and international law and opposed by most people in the United States. President Trump bypassed Congress and began this war without authorization—an executive war-making precedent set by Truman at the start of the Korean War. In 1950, Truman sent U.S. troops to Korea without a congressional declaration of war, calling it a "police action" rather than a war. That decision cost 3 million lives and set a precedent that presidents have since used to wage war without the consent of the American people or their representatives. Trump is following the same playbook—and the consequences, as Koreans know too well, can last for decades. The Trump administration's disregard for the rule of law endangers all of us. The war costs too much Koreans are already paying for this war through reduced crude oil imports, historic stock market drops, and rising grocery bills, heating bills, and gas prices. On top of this, the U.S. has taken the THAAD missile defense system—the system that cost Korea $7.5 billion in economic damage when China retaliated in 2017—out of Korea and redeployed it to the Middle East to fight a war Koreans never asked for Among the administration's claims justifying the attacks against Iran was the need to intervene following the Iranian government's killing of thousands of its own citizens in the streets in January. Such horrific state violence is abhorrent. As a Quaker advocate of peace, I mourn this loss of life. I must hold two truths in tension: that the Iranian regime committed brutal acts, and this war is illegal and catastrophic. The Trump administration's claims about helping the Iranian people fall flat when the U.S. government is dropping bombs on over 600 Iranian schools and hospitals and the President is threatening that "a whole civilization will die" in Iran. In five weeks, U.S. and Israeli strikes have killed over 1600 civilians and displaced millions of people. Bombing Iranian civilians does not help people—it kills them. Koreans have seen this story unfold before. An estimated 3 million people, approximately 20 percent of the population on the Korean Peninsula, were killed in the Korean War. American bombers targeted "everything that moved in North Korea, every brick standing on top of another," according to senior State Department official Dean Rusk. Both Koreas were left in devastation and destitution. The Korean War has cost the U.S. and South Korea over a trillion dollars over the past 76 years. South Korea spends $1 billion annually just to host 28,500 U.S. troops. Now we hear the Pentagon tell Congress that the first week of the Iran war cost more than $11.3 billion, then requested $200 billion more from American taxpayers. Trump then requested warships from South Korea and other allies (though he was dissatisfied with their response). All that money spent on war has not and will not bring peace—not to Korea nor to Iran. War takes resources away from caring for the elderly, educating children, housing families, and providing infrastructure. No one wins in war because war hurts us all. What we can do Sixty-one percent of people in the U.S. oppose the war against Iran. This is the most unpopular U.S. war has ever been at its inception. In South Korea, 55 percent oppose their government's support of the war, and 89 percent worry the war will continue. This is an opportunity to turn opposition into action. Because Koreans are bearing many costs from this war, they have justification to urge their government to refuse further involvement and support an end to the war. The National Assembly has constitutional authority over overseas military deployments. Civil society can advocate that lawmakers exercise that authority by standing firm that there will be no Korean naval deployment to the Strait of Hormuz and no transfer of Korean-made weapons systems to countries participating in this war. Spain has given a powerful example of what principled refusal looks like by denying the U.S. use of its military bases and closing its airspace to U.S. aircraft involved in strikes against Iran, even under threat of trade retaliation. South Korea can and should follow that example. Civil society must ask for more than refusal, they must call for peace. A fragile two-week ceasefire was reached on April 8, but it is already at risk of collapse. We must all call on our elected leaders to support a permanent ceasefire. How many more lives and how much more money are we willing to spend on a legacy of wars that prove, time and again, that war hurts us all? ※Austin Headrick is the Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for Asia at American Friends Service Committee. Prior to joining AFSC, Austin lived in South Korea for seven years, working on peace education. Austin obtained an MA in Korean Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul.

© 2026 Korean Sharing Movement. All rights reserved.

Conflict Structures on the Korean Peninsula and the Tasks of Peacebuilding

By Dr. Yonghwan Choi Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS)

As wars continue in Europe and the Middle East, peace and security issues on the Korean Peninsula have gained increasing attention. South Korea finds itself amid geopolitical turmoil, shaped not only by three major nuclear powers-the United States, China, and Russia-but also by North Korea, which has rejected calls to abandon its nuclear weapons. In addition, signs of Japan’s rearmament have become increasingly evident, along with warnings of a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait, all adding to the situation with the aforementioned ongoing battles in the Middle East. Together, these developments reflect a broader global trend toward intensifying military competition and raise concerns that South Korea could be drawn into conflicts it does not seek. In this context, this article examines the distinctive structure of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and explores the tasks necessary to overcome existing tensions and build sustainable peace. Smoke rises over Tehran, following an Israeli missile strike on March 1 (Source: AFP–Yonhap News) The Characteristics and Challenges of the Conflict Structure on the Korean Peninsula Seeking peacebuilding initiatives for the Korean Peninsula requires an understanding of the peninsula’s conflict structure, which consists of three overlapping layers. The first layer is the structure of international political conflict. The U.S.–Soviet Cold War in the twentieth century was a direct cause of the division of the Korean Peninsula. During the Cold War era, the structure of international political conflict largely overlapped with that of the inter-Korean conflict, making the establishment of a peace regime virtually impossible. The armistice regime established after the Korean War directly and institutionally linked these two structures, which remain in force today. The second layer is the inter-Korean conflict, which constitutes another axis of division on the Korean Peninsula. The governments of both Koreas were born while denying each other’s legitimacy, and the division that could not be overcome even after the Korean War has continued to generate mutual hostility and distrust. As a result, even when inter-Korean relations remain stable for a period of time, it quickly reverts to confrontation whenever a minor incident occurs, underscoring both states’ inability to transcend a realist framework. As a result, neighboring countries are showing less interest in the Korean Peninsula issue or are increasingly pursuing solutions centered on their own interests. The last layer is domestic conflict within South Korea, often referred to as the “South-South conflict.” This form of conflict emerged in the post–Cold War period as the international conflict structure weakened and new approaches to resolving inter-Korean tensions began to take shape. Initially, the term “South–South conflict” was coined by the media to describe the situation, and its substance remained unclear. Over time, however, through successive elections, it developed into a phenomenon with clear political salience. The challenge is that these overlapping layers of conflict interact, making resolving tensions far more difficult and complex. The structure of international political conflict, for instance, exacerbates inter-Korean tensions or undermines efforts to improve relations between the two Koreas. Also, in South Korea, where elections and changes of government are inevitable, internal conflicts undermine the sustainability and stability of policies toward North Korea, thereby weakening confidence in those policies. In other words, the conflict structure on the Korean Peninsula continues to operate as long as conflicts at any level remain unresolved. With the advent of the post–Cold War era and the weakening of the international political conflict structure, attempts were made to transform inter-Korean relations. Yet these efforts ultimately faltered, in part due to domestic political polarization within South Korea. Against the backdrop of today’s rapidly shifting global order, what tasks lie ahead for building peace on the Korean Peninsula? Changes in the Global Landscape and the Tasks Ahead As the post–Cold War order of liberal globalization draws to a close, the structure of international political conflict shaping peace on the Korean Peninsula is once again coming to the fore. As U.S.–China strategic competition has become more overt and assumed a structural character, the liberal order underpinning globalization is collapsing into pieces. At the same time, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, including Russia and the United States, are pursuing changes to the status quo through the use of force, thereby undermining the very postwar order they themselves helped create. The U.S., which remains South Korea’s only formal ally, has not only begun redefining alliance relations in increasingly transactional terms but has also fueled further uncertainty by expressing ambitions toward the territories of allied countries. Furthermore, Washington is increasingly demanding a greater role-sharing from its allies, including South Korea. As a result, on the one hand, the risk that South Korea could be drawn into conflicts it does not seek is growing; on the other hand, the country’s autonomy in foreign and North Korea policy is becoming increasingly constrained. For instance, the U.S. has asked what role South Korea could play in the event of a clash with China and, more recently, has requested troop deployments for wars it has initiated. The difficulty lies in the fact that the structure of international political conflict cannot be altered through South Korea’s efforts alone. What matters, then, is to minimize the negative effects arising from this structure. To this end, the first task is to enhance South Korea’s “strategic autonomy.”Given the nature of its relations to the U.S., South Korea would not be able to expect complete autonomy. Nevertheless, a strategic approach aimed at securing national interests is indispensable. As the U.S. increasingly frames alliances in transactional terms, the era in which allies were assumed to share common interests has effectively come to an end. Under these circumstances, the South Korean government needs to develop policy tools and leverage that would allow it to effectively advance its own position within US-South Korea relations. Also, in order to cope with growing uncertainty in the international environment, it is necessary to shift toward a foreign policy strategy grounded in autonomous self-defense. Recent developments in international politics suggest that major powers are increasingly making policy decisions based primarily on their own national interests, ushering in what might be described as an era of “every nation for itself”. As a result, neighboring countries are showing less interest in the Korean Peninsula issue or are increasingly pursuing solutions centered on their own. Under these circumstances, it is crucial for South Korea, as a principal stakeholder in the Korean Peninsula issue, to exercise ‘policy leadership’ by setting the agenda and proposing solutions from the perspective of its own interests and priorities. The Current State of Inter-Korean Relations and the Tasks Ahead North Korea continues to adhere to the position it articulated at the end of 2023, defining inter-Korean relations as those of “two hostile states.” At the recently convened 9th Party Congress, Pyongyang reaffirmed that this decision was “not a temporary or tactical measure but a historic choice,” making clear that it would not alter its policy orientation regarding the 'hostile two-state' framework. At the same time, while maintaining that it would take the toughest stance toward the United States, North Korea left open the possibility of dialogue, noting that there would be no reason not to maintain good relations if its status were respected and Washington withdrew its hostile policy toward Pyongyang. Of course, following the 9th Party Congress, the likelihood is high that North Korea’s willingness to negotiate has somewhat receded in the wake of the U.S. attack on Iran. Nevertheless, considering the confidence North Korea displayed at the congress, the possibility remains that it could attempt a direct negotiation with President Trump in order to secure what it calls its “right to development.” It should be remembered, however, that while U.S.–North Korea negotiations may provide momentum for changes in inter-Korean relations, they do not alter the fundamental nature of the problem. To begin with, North Korea has made clear that its nuclear weapons are no longer a subject of negotiation. Under these circumstances, the central issue is whether it is possible to move beyond "North Korea unclear reductionism. In other words, if the position that the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved first continues to be maintained, efforts to ease inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea tensions will inevitably struggle to even take the first step. If there is no viable short-term solution to the nuclear issue through negotiations, alternative pathways must be explored. These could include prioritizing progress toward a peace regime while maintaining a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula as a long-term objective. For such an approach to be viable, a consensus between South Korea and the United States on this matter will also be necessary.

Another challenge is that North Korea has refused not only dialogue or negotiation with South Korea but also any form of communication. The 600 millimeter multiple rocket launcher that North Korea test-fired around the time of the 9th Party Congress was clearly aimed at the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government has taken several preemptive and unilateral peace measures, including suspending the launch of anti–North Korea leaflets and halting loudspeaker broadcasts, in an effort to encourage a change in North Korea’s attitude. While it is certainly a positive outcome that North Korea has shown some limited response to these measures, this has yet to translate into a fundamental change in its hostile posture. In fact, North Korea has rarely entered negotiations simply because South Korea or the United States called for dialogue or adopted a conciliatory approach. More often, Pyongyang has initiated talks when it judged negotiations to be necessary for its own purposes. In other words, persuading North Korea to enter into dialogue requires altering the strategic landscape that shapes Pyongyang’s perception of the Korean Peninsula. To this end, first, it is important to carefully manage relations with China and Russia, the two countries on which North Korea’s external strategy is largely focused. Admittedly, given the current realities of North Korea’s relations with the two states, it would be very difficult to alter Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing and Moscow simply through managing South Korea’s relations with them. Yet, it is important to note that North Korea also harbors a certain degree of strategic mistrust toward both China and Russia. In an international environment increasingly characterized by each country pursuing its own interests, there is always the possibility that China or Russia may prioritize their national interests over those of North Korea. In this sense, the expansion of cooperation between South Korea and China, or between South Korea and Russia, and the resulting growth of shared interests could in itself raise doubts in Pyongyang. Second, issues such as “peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” and “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” should be elevated as shared regional concerns in East Asia. North Korea’s nuclear and strategic weapons programs risk provoking neighboring countries and undermining regional security, which means that these issues converge not only with the interests of the United States and Japan but also, to some extent, with those of China and Russia. In order to build a regional consensus that includes even North Korea’s traditional partners, China and Russia, it will be essential to pursue an inclusive foreign policy strategy that neither targets nor excludes any particular country. Such an inclusive approach is also important for South Korea as it seeks to secure its own survival in an international environment increasingly shaped by great-power politics. Domestic Challenges Within South Korean Society In democratic states, changes in government and policy resulting from periodic elections are to some extent inevitable. However, frequent shifts in foreign and North Korea policy can undermine confidence in the state. Even if inter-Korean relations improve and enter a phase of dialogue, meaningful progress in negotiations will be difficult if there is no trust in the sustainability of agreements. In other words, enhancing the consistency and stability of foreign and North Korea policy is essential. To achieve this, a minimum level of domestic consensus on the basic principles and direction of North Korea policy must be established within South Korean society. Unfortunately, one of the defining lines separating the so-called progressive and conservative political camps in South Korea is their respective stance toward North Korea policy. This division has become so deeply entrenched that it could be described not merely as “South-South conflict” but “South-South division.” Unless it is addressed, strengthening the credibility of South Korea’s policy toward North Korea will remain difficult. Another problem is the circulation of inaccurate information about North Korea, which contributes to political polarization in South Korea. In turn, this polarization further encourages the deliberate distortion of information and the spread of misinformation, creating a vicious circle. This pattern has emerged in large part because the ecosystem surrounding North Korea and inter-Korean affairs has eroded. As issues related to North Korea and unification have increasingly been treated as sensitive or highly politicized agendas, they have gradually moved further away from the sphere of ordinary public interest. Errors and distortions in information can only be corrected through the provision of accurate information. Restoring the ecosystem surrounding North Korea and inter-Korean relations is therefore essential. Concluding Remarks At present, the overlapping layers of conflict surrounding the Korean Peninsula are all operating in directions that run counter to peace, leaving the outlook for peace on the peninsula rather bleak. As the international environment moves toward intensified military competition and many of the strategic arms control regimes established after the Cold War are being dismantled one after another, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is unlikely to be an easy task. At a time when major powers are increasingly focused on pursuing their own national interests, it also seems unrealistic to expect cooperation on the Korean Peninsula issue alone. Under these circumstances, as North Korea reads the strategic landscape in this way and seeks to align with China and Russia to withstand pressure from the United States and the broader international community, it is difficult to expect meaningful inter-Korean cooperation to emerge. At the same time, amid deepening political polarization within South Korea, forging a consensus between progressive and conservative parties on North Korea policy appears almost as difficult as reaching agreements with North Korea itself. For this very reason, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is all the more precarious. The peninsula lies at the center of a region where not only the United States, China, and Russia but also North Korea possess nuclear weapons, yet there are no agreements or regimes governing strategic arms control. As wars in Europe and the Middle East have drawn global attention to the expansion of military arsenals, the Korean Peninsula stands out as a place where large quantities of weapons are concentrated. However, there is not even a minimal communication channel between the two Koreas to prevent accidental clashes. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is therefore in a more fragile state than at any time in recent memory. This is precisely why efforts to promote peace on the peninsula must not be abandoned, no matter how difficult the circumstances may be. The current structure of international political conflict differs from that of the Cold War era, when confrontation was defined primarily along ideological lines. Today, conflict and cooperation intersect, and the boundaries of conflict are often ambiguous or shift depending on the issue at hand. While the existence of a conflict structure remains the same, the very nature of it and the way it operates have changed. Moreover, the national power and international standing of South Korea have also changed significantly. Not only has the character of the structure evolved, but the capabilities of the actors involved have also transformed. This suggests that South Korea should avoid holding a peripheral mindset and play a more active role in trying to shape peace on the Korean Peninsula.

© 2026 Korean Sharing Movement. All rights reserved.

Conflict Structures on the Korean Peninsula and the Tasks of Peacebuilding

By Dr. Yonghwan Choi Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS)

As wars continue in Europe and the Middle East, peace and security issues on the Korean Peninsula have gained increasing attention. South Korea finds itself amid geopolitical turmoil, shaped not only by three major nuclear powers-the United States, China, and Russia-but also by North Korea, which has rejected calls to abandon its nuclear weapons. In addition, signs of Japan’s rearmament have become increasingly evident, along with warnings of a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait, all adding to the situation with the aforementioned ongoing battles in the Middle East. Together, these developments reflect a broader global trend toward intensifying military competition and raise concerns that South Korea could be drawn into conflicts it does not seek. In this context, this article examines the distinctive structure of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and explores the tasks necessary to overcome existing tensions and build sustainable peace. Smoke rises over Tehran, following an Israeli missile strike on March 1 (Source: AFP–Yonhap News) The Characteristics and Challenges of the Conflict Structure on the Korean Peninsula Seeking peacebuilding initiatives for the Korean Peninsula requires an understanding of the peninsula’s conflict structure, which consists of three overlapping layers. The first layer is the structure of international political conflict. The U.S.–Soviet Cold War in the twentieth century was a direct cause of the division of the Korean Peninsula. During the Cold War era, the structure of international political conflict largely overlapped with that of the inter-Korean conflict, making the establishment of a peace regime virtually impossible. The armistice regime established after the Korean War directly and institutionally linked these two structures, which remain in force today. The second layer is the inter-Korean conflict, which constitutes another axis of division on the Korean Peninsula. The governments of both Koreas were born while denying each other’s legitimacy, and the division that could not be overcome even after the Korean War has continued to generate mutual hostility and distrust. As a result, even when inter-Korean relations remain stable for a period of time, it quickly reverts to confrontation whenever a minor incident occurs, underscoring both states’ inability to transcend a realist framework. As a result, neighboring countries are showing less interest in the Korean Peninsula issue or are increasingly pursuing solutions centered on their own interests. The last layer is domestic conflict within South Korea, often referred to as the “South-South conflict.” This form of conflict emerged in the post–Cold War period as the international conflict structure weakened and new approaches to resolving inter-Korean tensions began to take shape. Initially, the term “South–South conflict” was coined by the media to describe the situation, and its substance remained unclear. Over time, however, through successive elections, it developed into a phenomenon with clear political salience. The challenge is that these overlapping layers of conflict interact, making resolving tensions far more difficult and complex. The structure of international political conflict, for instance, exacerbates inter-Korean tensions or undermines efforts to improve relations between the two Koreas. Also, in South Korea, where elections and changes of government are inevitable, internal conflicts undermine the sustainability and stability of policies toward North Korea, thereby weakening confidence in those policies. In other words, the conflict structure on the Korean Peninsula continues to operate as long as conflicts at any level remain unresolved. With the advent of the post–Cold War era and the weakening of the international political conflict structure, attempts were made to transform inter-Korean relations. Yet these efforts ultimately faltered, in part due to domestic political polarization within South Korea. Against the backdrop of today’s rapidly shifting global order, what tasks lie ahead for building peace on the Korean Peninsula? Changes in the Global Landscape and the Tasks Ahead As the post–Cold War order of liberal globalization draws to a close, the structure of international political conflict shaping peace on the Korean Peninsula is once again coming to the fore. As U.S.–China strategic competition has become more overt and assumed a structural character, the liberal order underpinning globalization is collapsing into pieces. At the same time, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, including Russia and the United States, are pursuing changes to the status quo through the use of force, thereby undermining the very postwar order they themselves helped create. The U.S., which remains South Korea’s only formal ally, has not only begun redefining alliance relations in increasingly transactional terms but has also fueled further uncertainty by expressing ambitions toward the territories of allied countries. Furthermore, Washington is increasingly demanding a greater role-sharing from its allies, including South Korea. As a result, on the one hand, the risk that South Korea could be drawn into conflicts it does not seek is growing; on the other hand, the country’s autonomy in foreign and North Korea policy is becoming increasingly constrained. For instance, the U.S. has asked what role South Korea could play in the event of a clash with China and, more recently, has requested troop deployments for wars it has initiated. The difficulty lies in the fact that the structure of international political conflict cannot be altered through South Korea’s efforts alone. What matters, then, is to minimize the negative effects arising from this structure. To this end, the first task is to enhance South Korea’s “strategic autonomy.”Given the nature of its relations to the U.S., South Korea would not be able to expect complete autonomy. Nevertheless, a strategic approach aimed at securing national interests is indispensable. As the U.S. increasingly frames alliances in transactional terms, the era in which allies were assumed to share common interests has effectively come to an end. Under these circumstances, the South Korean government needs to develop policy tools and leverage that would allow it to effectively advance its own position within US-South Korea relations. Also, in order to cope with growing uncertainty in the international environment, it is necessary to shift toward a foreign policy strategy grounded in autonomous self-defense. Recent developments in international politics suggest that major powers are increasingly making policy decisions based primarily on their own national interests, ushering in what might be described as an era of “every nation for itself”. As a result, neighboring countries are showing less interest in the Korean Peninsula issue or are increasingly pursuing solutions centered on their own. Under these circumstances, it is crucial for South Korea, as a principal stakeholder in the Korean Peninsula issue, to exercise ‘policy leadership’ by setting the agenda and proposing solutions from the perspective of its own interests and priorities. The Current State of Inter-Korean Relations and the Tasks Ahead North Korea continues to adhere to the position it articulated at the end of 2023, defining inter-Korean relations as those of “two hostile states.” At the recently convened 9th Party Congress, Pyongyang reaffirmed that this decision was “not a temporary or tactical measure but a historic choice,” making clear that it would not alter its policy orientation regarding the 'hostile two-state' framework. At the same time, while maintaining that it would take the toughest stance toward the United States, North Korea left open the possibility of dialogue, noting that there would be no reason not to maintain good relations if its status were respected and Washington withdrew its hostile policy toward Pyongyang. Of course, following the 9th Party Congress, the likelihood is high that North Korea’s willingness to negotiate has somewhat receded in the wake of the U.S. attack on Iran. Nevertheless, considering the confidence North Korea displayed at the congress, the possibility remains that it could attempt a direct negotiation with President Trump in order to secure what it calls its “right to development.” It should be remembered, however, that while U.S.–North Korea negotiations may provide momentum for changes in inter-Korean relations, they do not alter the fundamental nature of the problem. To begin with, North Korea has made clear that its nuclear weapons are no longer a subject of negotiation. Under these circumstances, the central issue is whether it is possible to move beyond "North Korea unclear reductionism. In other words, if the position that the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved first continues to be maintained, efforts to ease inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea tensions will inevitably struggle to even take the first step. If there is no viable short-term solution to the nuclear issue through negotiations, alternative pathways must be explored. These could include prioritizing progress toward a peace regime while maintaining a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula as a long-term objective. For such an approach to be viable, a consensus between South Korea and the United States on this matter will also be necessary.

Another challenge is that North Korea has refused not only dialogue or negotiation with South Korea but also any form of communication. The 600 millimeter multiple rocket launcher that North Korea test-fired around the time of the 9th Party Congress was clearly aimed at the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government has taken several preemptive and unilateral peace measures, including suspending the launch of anti–North Korea leaflets and halting loudspeaker broadcasts, in an effort to encourage a change in North Korea’s attitude. While it is certainly a positive outcome that North Korea has shown some limited response to these measures, this has yet to translate into a fundamental change in its hostile posture. In fact, North Korea has rarely entered negotiations simply because South Korea or the United States called for dialogue or adopted a conciliatory approach. More often, Pyongyang has initiated talks when it judged negotiations to be necessary for its own purposes. In other words, persuading North Korea to enter into dialogue requires altering the strategic landscape that shapes Pyongyang’s perception of the Korean Peninsula. To this end, first, it is important to carefully manage relations with China and Russia, the two countries on which North Korea’s external strategy is largely focused. Admittedly, given the current realities of North Korea’s relations with the two states, it would be very difficult to alter Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing and Moscow simply through managing South Korea’s relations with them. Yet, it is important to note that North Korea also harbors a certain degree of strategic mistrust toward both China and Russia. In an international environment increasingly characterized by each country pursuing its own interests, there is always the possibility that China or Russia may prioritize their national interests over those of North Korea. In this sense, the expansion of cooperation between South Korea and China, or between South Korea and Russia, and the resulting growth of shared interests could in itself raise doubts in Pyongyang. Second, issues such as “peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” and “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” should be elevated as shared regional concerns in East Asia. North Korea’s nuclear and strategic weapons programs risk provoking neighboring countries and undermining regional security, which means that these issues converge not only with the interests of the United States and Japan but also, to some extent, with those of China and Russia. In order to build a regional consensus that includes even North Korea’s traditional partners, China and Russia, it will be essential to pursue an inclusive foreign policy strategy that neither targets nor excludes any particular country. Such an inclusive approach is also important for South Korea as it seeks to secure its own survival in an international environment increasingly shaped by great-power politics. Domestic Challenges Within South Korean Society In democratic states, changes in government and policy resulting from periodic elections are to some extent inevitable. However, frequent shifts in foreign and North Korea policy can undermine confidence in the state. Even if inter-Korean relations improve and enter a phase of dialogue, meaningful progress in negotiations will be difficult if there is no trust in the sustainability of agreements. In other words, enhancing the consistency and stability of foreign and North Korea policy is essential. To achieve this, a minimum level of domestic consensus on the basic principles and direction of North Korea policy must be established within South Korean society. Unfortunately, one of the defining lines separating the so-called progressive and conservative political camps in South Korea is their respective stance toward North Korea policy. This division has become so deeply entrenched that it could be described not merely as “South-South conflict” but “South-South division.” Unless it is addressed, strengthening the credibility of South Korea’s policy toward North Korea will remain difficult. Another problem is the circulation of inaccurate information about North Korea, which contributes to political polarization in South Korea. In turn, this polarization further encourages the deliberate distortion of information and the spread of misinformation, creating a vicious circle. This pattern has emerged in large part because the ecosystem surrounding North Korea and inter-Korean affairs has eroded. As issues related to North Korea and unification have increasingly been treated as sensitive or highly politicized agendas, they have gradually moved further away from the sphere of ordinary public interest. Errors and distortions in information can only be corrected through the provision of accurate information. Restoring the ecosystem surrounding North Korea and inter-Korean relations is therefore essential. Concluding Remarks At present, the overlapping layers of conflict surrounding the Korean Peninsula are all operating in directions that run counter to peace, leaving the outlook for peace on the peninsula rather bleak. As the international environment moves toward intensified military competition and many of the strategic arms control regimes established after the Cold War are being dismantled one after another, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is unlikely to be an easy task. At a time when major powers are increasingly focused on pursuing their own national interests, it also seems unrealistic to expect cooperation on the Korean Peninsula issue alone. Under these circumstances, as North Korea reads the strategic landscape in this way and seeks to align with China and Russia to withstand pressure from the United States and the broader international community, it is difficult to expect meaningful inter-Korean cooperation to emerge. At the same time, amid deepening political polarization within South Korea, forging a consensus between progressive and conservative parties on North Korea policy appears almost as difficult as reaching agreements with North Korea itself. For this very reason, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is all the more precarious. The peninsula lies at the center of a region where not only the United States, China, and Russia but also North Korea possess nuclear weapons, yet there are no agreements or regimes governing strategic arms control. As wars in Europe and the Middle East have drawn global attention to the expansion of military arsenals, the Korean Peninsula stands out as a place where large quantities of weapons are concentrated. However, there is not even a minimal communication channel between the two Koreas to prevent accidental clashes. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is therefore in a more fragile state than at any time in recent memory. This is precisely why efforts to promote peace on the peninsula must not be abandoned, no matter how difficult the circumstances may be. The current structure of international political conflict differs from that of the Cold War era, when confrontation was defined primarily along ideological lines. Today, conflict and cooperation intersect, and the boundaries of conflict are often ambiguous or shift depending on the issue at hand. While the existence of a conflict structure remains the same, the very nature of it and the way it operates have changed. Moreover, the national power and international standing of South Korea have also changed significantly. Not only has the character of the structure evolved, but the capabilities of the actors involved have also transformed. This suggests that South Korea should avoid holding a peripheral mindset and play a more active role in trying to shape peace on the Korean Peninsula.

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