Conflict Structures on the Korean Peninsula and the Tasks of Peacebuilding

By Dr. Yonghwan Choi Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS)

As wars continue in Europe and the Middle East, peace and security issues on the Korean Peninsula have gained increasing attention. South Korea finds itself amid geopolitical turmoil, shaped not only by three major nuclear powers-the United States, China, and Russia-but also by North Korea, which has rejected calls to abandon its nuclear weapons. In addition, signs of Japan’s rearmament have become increasingly evident, along with warnings of a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait, all adding to the situation with the aforementioned ongoing battles in the Middle East. Together, these developments reflect a broader global trend toward intensifying military competition and raise concerns that South Korea could be drawn into conflicts it does not seek. In this context, this article examines the distinctive structure of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and explores the tasks necessary to overcome existing tensions and build sustainable peace. Smoke rises over Tehran, following an Israeli missile strike on March 1 (Source: AFP–Yonhap News) The Characteristics and Challenges of the Conflict Structure on the Korean Peninsula Seeking peacebuilding initiatives for the Korean Peninsula requires an understanding of the peninsula’s conflict structure, which consists of three overlapping layers. The first layer is the structure of international political conflict. The U.S.–Soviet Cold War in the twentieth century was a direct cause of the division of the Korean Peninsula. During the Cold War era, the structure of international political conflict largely overlapped with that of the inter-Korean conflict, making the establishment of a peace regime virtually impossible. The armistice regime established after the Korean War directly and institutionally linked these two structures, which remain in force today. The second layer is the inter-Korean conflict, which constitutes another axis of division on the Korean Peninsula. The governments of both Koreas were born while denying each other’s legitimacy, and the division that could not be overcome even after the Korean War has continued to generate mutual hostility and distrust. As a result, even when inter-Korean relations remain stable for a period of time, it quickly reverts to confrontation whenever a minor incident occurs, underscoring both states’ inability to transcend a realist framework. As a result, neighboring countries are showing less interest in the Korean Peninsula issue or are increasingly pursuing solutions centered on their own interests. The last layer is domestic conflict within South Korea, often referred to as the “South-South conflict.” This form of conflict emerged in the post–Cold War period as the international conflict structure weakened and new approaches to resolving inter-Korean tensions began to take shape. Initially, the term “South–South conflict” was coined by the media to describe the situation, and its substance remained unclear. Over time, however, through successive elections, it developed into a phenomenon with clear political salience. The challenge is that these overlapping layers of conflict interact, making resolving tensions far more difficult and complex. The structure of international political conflict, for instance, exacerbates inter-Korean tensions or undermines efforts to improve relations between the two Koreas. Also, in South Korea, where elections and changes of government are inevitable, internal conflicts undermine the sustainability and stability of policies toward North Korea, thereby weakening confidence in those policies. In other words, the conflict structure on the Korean Peninsula continues to operate as long as conflicts at any level remain unresolved. With the advent of the post–Cold War era and the weakening of the international political conflict structure, attempts were made to transform inter-Korean relations. Yet these efforts ultimately faltered, in part due to domestic political polarization within South Korea. Against the backdrop of today’s rapidly shifting global order, what tasks lie ahead for building peace on the Korean Peninsula? Changes in the Global Landscape and the Tasks Ahead As the post–Cold War order of liberal globalization draws to a close, the structure of international political conflict shaping peace on the Korean Peninsula is once again coming to the fore. As U.S.–China strategic competition has become more overt and assumed a structural character, the liberal order underpinning globalization is collapsing into pieces. At the same time, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, including Russia and the United States, are pursuing changes to the status quo through the use of force, thereby undermining the very postwar order they themselves helped create. The U.S., which remains South Korea’s only formal ally, has not only begun redefining alliance relations in increasingly transactional terms but has also fueled further uncertainty by expressing ambitions toward the territories of allied countries. Furthermore, Washington is increasingly demanding a greater role-sharing from its allies, including South Korea. As a result, on the one hand, the risk that South Korea could be drawn into conflicts it does not seek is growing; on the other hand, the country’s autonomy in foreign and North Korea policy is becoming increasingly constrained. For instance, the U.S. has asked what role South Korea could play in the event of a clash with China and, more recently, has requested troop deployments for wars it has initiated. The difficulty lies in the fact that the structure of international political conflict cannot be altered through South Korea’s efforts alone. What matters, then, is to minimize the negative effects arising from this structure. To this end, the first task is to enhance South Korea’s “strategic autonomy.”Given the nature of its relations to the U.S., South Korea would not be able to expect complete autonomy. Nevertheless, a strategic approach aimed at securing national interests is indispensable. As the U.S. increasingly frames alliances in transactional terms, the era in which allies were assumed to share common interests has effectively come to an end. Under these circumstances, the South Korean government needs to develop policy tools and leverage that would allow it to effectively advance its own position within US-South Korea relations. Also, in order to cope with growing uncertainty in the international environment, it is necessary to shift toward a foreign policy strategy grounded in autonomous self-defense. Recent developments in international politics suggest that major powers are increasingly making policy decisions based primarily on their own national interests, ushering in what might be described as an era of “every nation for itself”. As a result, neighboring countries are showing less interest in the Korean Peninsula issue or are increasingly pursuing solutions centered on their own. Under these circumstances, it is crucial for South Korea, as a principal stakeholder in the Korean Peninsula issue, to exercise ‘policy leadership’ by setting the agenda and proposing solutions from the perspective of its own interests and priorities. The Current State of Inter-Korean Relations and the Tasks Ahead North Korea continues to adhere to the position it articulated at the end of 2023, defining inter-Korean relations as those of “two hostile states.” At the recently convened 9th Party Congress, Pyongyang reaffirmed that this decision was “not a temporary or tactical measure but a historic choice,” making clear that it would not alter its policy orientation regarding the 'hostile two-state' framework. At the same time, while maintaining that it would take the toughest stance toward the United States, North Korea left open the possibility of dialogue, noting that there would be no reason not to maintain good relations if its status were respected and Washington withdrew its hostile policy toward Pyongyang. Of course, following the 9th Party Congress, the likelihood is high that North Korea’s willingness to negotiate has somewhat receded in the wake of the U.S. attack on Iran. Nevertheless, considering the confidence North Korea displayed at the congress, the possibility remains that it could attempt a direct negotiation with President Trump in order to secure what it calls its “right to development.” It should be remembered, however, that while U.S.–North Korea negotiations may provide momentum for changes in inter-Korean relations, they do not alter the fundamental nature of the problem. To begin with, North Korea has made clear that its nuclear weapons are no longer a subject of negotiation. Under these circumstances, the central issue is whether it is possible to move beyond "North Korea unclear reductionism. In other words, if the position that the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved first continues to be maintained, efforts to ease inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea tensions will inevitably struggle to even take the first step. If there is no viable short-term solution to the nuclear issue through negotiations, alternative pathways must be explored. These could include prioritizing progress toward a peace regime while maintaining a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula as a long-term objective. For such an approach to be viable, a consensus between South Korea and the United States on this matter will also be necessary.

Another challenge is that North Korea has refused not only dialogue or negotiation with South Korea but also any form of communication. The 600 millimeter multiple rocket launcher that North Korea test-fired around the time of the 9th Party Congress was clearly aimed at the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government has taken several preemptive and unilateral peace measures, including suspending the launch of anti–North Korea leaflets and halting loudspeaker broadcasts, in an effort to encourage a change in North Korea’s attitude. While it is certainly a positive outcome that North Korea has shown some limited response to these measures, this has yet to translate into a fundamental change in its hostile posture. In fact, North Korea has rarely entered negotiations simply because South Korea or the United States called for dialogue or adopted a conciliatory approach. More often, Pyongyang has initiated talks when it judged negotiations to be necessary for its own purposes. In other words, persuading North Korea to enter into dialogue requires altering the strategic landscape that shapes Pyongyang’s perception of the Korean Peninsula. To this end, first, it is important to carefully manage relations with China and Russia, the two countries on which North Korea’s external strategy is largely focused. Admittedly, given the current realities of North Korea’s relations with the two states, it would be very difficult to alter Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing and Moscow simply through managing South Korea’s relations with them. Yet, it is important to note that North Korea also harbors a certain degree of strategic mistrust toward both China and Russia. In an international environment increasingly characterized by each country pursuing its own interests, there is always the possibility that China or Russia may prioritize their national interests over those of North Korea. In this sense, the expansion of cooperation between South Korea and China, or between South Korea and Russia, and the resulting growth of shared interests could in itself raise doubts in Pyongyang. Second, issues such as “peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” and “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” should be elevated as shared regional concerns in East Asia. North Korea’s nuclear and strategic weapons programs risk provoking neighboring countries and undermining regional security, which means that these issues converge not only with the interests of the United States and Japan but also, to some extent, with those of China and Russia. In order to build a regional consensus that includes even North Korea’s traditional partners, China and Russia, it will be essential to pursue an inclusive foreign policy strategy that neither targets nor excludes any particular country. Such an inclusive approach is also important for South Korea as it seeks to secure its own survival in an international environment increasingly shaped by great-power politics. Domestic Challenges Within South Korean Society In democratic states, changes in government and policy resulting from periodic elections are to some extent inevitable. However, frequent shifts in foreign and North Korea policy can undermine confidence in the state. Even if inter-Korean relations improve and enter a phase of dialogue, meaningful progress in negotiations will be difficult if there is no trust in the sustainability of agreements. In other words, enhancing the consistency and stability of foreign and North Korea policy is essential. To achieve this, a minimum level of domestic consensus on the basic principles and direction of North Korea policy must be established within South Korean society. Unfortunately, one of the defining lines separating the so-called progressive and conservative political camps in South Korea is their respective stance toward North Korea policy. This division has become so deeply entrenched that it could be described not merely as “South-South conflict” but “South-South division.” Unless it is addressed, strengthening the credibility of South Korea’s policy toward North Korea will remain difficult. Another problem is the circulation of inaccurate information about North Korea, which contributes to political polarization in South Korea. In turn, this polarization further encourages the deliberate distortion of information and the spread of misinformation, creating a vicious circle. This pattern has emerged in large part because the ecosystem surrounding North Korea and inter-Korean affairs has eroded. As issues related to North Korea and unification have increasingly been treated as sensitive or highly politicized agendas, they have gradually moved further away from the sphere of ordinary public interest. Errors and distortions in information can only be corrected through the provision of accurate information. Restoring the ecosystem surrounding North Korea and inter-Korean relations is therefore essential. Concluding Remarks At present, the overlapping layers of conflict surrounding the Korean Peninsula are all operating in directions that run counter to peace, leaving the outlook for peace on the peninsula rather bleak. As the international environment moves toward intensified military competition and many of the strategic arms control regimes established after the Cold War are being dismantled one after another, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is unlikely to be an easy task. At a time when major powers are increasingly focused on pursuing their own national interests, it also seems unrealistic to expect cooperation on the Korean Peninsula issue alone. Under these circumstances, as North Korea reads the strategic landscape in this way and seeks to align with China and Russia to withstand pressure from the United States and the broader international community, it is difficult to expect meaningful inter-Korean cooperation to emerge. At the same time, amid deepening political polarization within South Korea, forging a consensus between progressive and conservative parties on North Korea policy appears almost as difficult as reaching agreements with North Korea itself. For this very reason, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is all the more precarious. The peninsula lies at the center of a region where not only the United States, China, and Russia but also North Korea possess nuclear weapons, yet there are no agreements or regimes governing strategic arms control. As wars in Europe and the Middle East have drawn global attention to the expansion of military arsenals, the Korean Peninsula stands out as a place where large quantities of weapons are concentrated. However, there is not even a minimal communication channel between the two Koreas to prevent accidental clashes. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is therefore in a more fragile state than at any time in recent memory. This is precisely why efforts to promote peace on the peninsula must not be abandoned, no matter how difficult the circumstances may be. The current structure of international political conflict differs from that of the Cold War era, when confrontation was defined primarily along ideological lines. Today, conflict and cooperation intersect, and the boundaries of conflict are often ambiguous or shift depending on the issue at hand. While the existence of a conflict structure remains the same, the very nature of it and the way it operates have changed. Moreover, the national power and international standing of South Korea have also changed significantly. Not only has the character of the structure evolved, but the capabilities of the actors involved have also transformed. This suggests that South Korea should avoid holding a peripheral mindset and play a more active role in trying to shape peace on the Korean Peninsula.

© 2026 Korean Sharing Movement. All rights reserved.

Conflict Structures on the Korean Peninsula and the Tasks of Peacebuilding

By Dr. Yonghwan Choi Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS)

As wars continue in Europe and the Middle East, peace and security issues on the Korean Peninsula have gained increasing attention. South Korea finds itself amid geopolitical turmoil, shaped not only by three major nuclear powers-the United States, China, and Russia-but also by North Korea, which has rejected calls to abandon its nuclear weapons. In addition, signs of Japan’s rearmament have become increasingly evident, along with warnings of a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait, all adding to the situation with the aforementioned ongoing battles in the Middle East. Together, these developments reflect a broader global trend toward intensifying military competition and raise concerns that South Korea could be drawn into conflicts it does not seek. In this context, this article examines the distinctive structure of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and explores the tasks necessary to overcome existing tensions and build sustainable peace. Smoke rises over Tehran, following an Israeli missile strike on March 1 (Source: AFP–Yonhap News) The Characteristics and Challenges of the Conflict Structure on the Korean Peninsula Seeking peacebuilding initiatives for the Korean Peninsula requires an understanding of the peninsula’s conflict structure, which consists of three overlapping layers. The first layer is the structure of international political conflict. The U.S.–Soviet Cold War in the twentieth century was a direct cause of the division of the Korean Peninsula. During the Cold War era, the structure of international political conflict largely overlapped with that of the inter-Korean conflict, making the establishment of a peace regime virtually impossible. The armistice regime established after the Korean War directly and institutionally linked these two structures, which remain in force today. The second layer is the inter-Korean conflict, which constitutes another axis of division on the Korean Peninsula. The governments of both Koreas were born while denying each other’s legitimacy, and the division that could not be overcome even after the Korean War has continued to generate mutual hostility and distrust. As a result, even when inter-Korean relations remain stable for a period of time, it quickly reverts to confrontation whenever a minor incident occurs, underscoring both states’ inability to transcend a realist framework. As a result, neighboring countries are showing less interest in the Korean Peninsula issue or are increasingly pursuing solutions centered on their own interests. The last layer is domestic conflict within South Korea, often referred to as the “South-South conflict.” This form of conflict emerged in the post–Cold War period as the international conflict structure weakened and new approaches to resolving inter-Korean tensions began to take shape. Initially, the term “South–South conflict” was coined by the media to describe the situation, and its substance remained unclear. Over time, however, through successive elections, it developed into a phenomenon with clear political salience. The challenge is that these overlapping layers of conflict interact, making resolving tensions far more difficult and complex. The structure of international political conflict, for instance, exacerbates inter-Korean tensions or undermines efforts to improve relations between the two Koreas. Also, in South Korea, where elections and changes of government are inevitable, internal conflicts undermine the sustainability and stability of policies toward North Korea, thereby weakening confidence in those policies. In other words, the conflict structure on the Korean Peninsula continues to operate as long as conflicts at any level remain unresolved. With the advent of the post–Cold War era and the weakening of the international political conflict structure, attempts were made to transform inter-Korean relations. Yet these efforts ultimately faltered, in part due to domestic political polarization within South Korea. Against the backdrop of today’s rapidly shifting global order, what tasks lie ahead for building peace on the Korean Peninsula? Changes in the Global Landscape and the Tasks Ahead As the post–Cold War order of liberal globalization draws to a close, the structure of international political conflict shaping peace on the Korean Peninsula is once again coming to the fore. As U.S.–China strategic competition has become more overt and assumed a structural character, the liberal order underpinning globalization is collapsing into pieces. At the same time, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, including Russia and the United States, are pursuing changes to the status quo through the use of force, thereby undermining the very postwar order they themselves helped create. The U.S., which remains South Korea’s only formal ally, has not only begun redefining alliance relations in increasingly transactional terms but has also fueled further uncertainty by expressing ambitions toward the territories of allied countries. Furthermore, Washington is increasingly demanding a greater role-sharing from its allies, including South Korea. As a result, on the one hand, the risk that South Korea could be drawn into conflicts it does not seek is growing; on the other hand, the country’s autonomy in foreign and North Korea policy is becoming increasingly constrained. For instance, the U.S. has asked what role South Korea could play in the event of a clash with China and, more recently, has requested troop deployments for wars it has initiated. The difficulty lies in the fact that the structure of international political conflict cannot be altered through South Korea’s efforts alone. What matters, then, is to minimize the negative effects arising from this structure. To this end, the first task is to enhance South Korea’s “strategic autonomy.”Given the nature of its relations to the U.S., South Korea would not be able to expect complete autonomy. Nevertheless, a strategic approach aimed at securing national interests is indispensable. As the U.S. increasingly frames alliances in transactional terms, the era in which allies were assumed to share common interests has effectively come to an end. Under these circumstances, the South Korean government needs to develop policy tools and leverage that would allow it to effectively advance its own position within US-South Korea relations. Also, in order to cope with growing uncertainty in the international environment, it is necessary to shift toward a foreign policy strategy grounded in autonomous self-defense. Recent developments in international politics suggest that major powers are increasingly making policy decisions based primarily on their own national interests, ushering in what might be described as an era of “every nation for itself”. As a result, neighboring countries are showing less interest in the Korean Peninsula issue or are increasingly pursuing solutions centered on their own. Under these circumstances, it is crucial for South Korea, as a principal stakeholder in the Korean Peninsula issue, to exercise ‘policy leadership’ by setting the agenda and proposing solutions from the perspective of its own interests and priorities. The Current State of Inter-Korean Relations and the Tasks Ahead North Korea continues to adhere to the position it articulated at the end of 2023, defining inter-Korean relations as those of “two hostile states.” At the recently convened 9th Party Congress, Pyongyang reaffirmed that this decision was “not a temporary or tactical measure but a historic choice,” making clear that it would not alter its policy orientation regarding the 'hostile two-state' framework. At the same time, while maintaining that it would take the toughest stance toward the United States, North Korea left open the possibility of dialogue, noting that there would be no reason not to maintain good relations if its status were respected and Washington withdrew its hostile policy toward Pyongyang. Of course, following the 9th Party Congress, the likelihood is high that North Korea’s willingness to negotiate has somewhat receded in the wake of the U.S. attack on Iran. Nevertheless, considering the confidence North Korea displayed at the congress, the possibility remains that it could attempt a direct negotiation with President Trump in order to secure what it calls its “right to development.” It should be remembered, however, that while U.S.–North Korea negotiations may provide momentum for changes in inter-Korean relations, they do not alter the fundamental nature of the problem. To begin with, North Korea has made clear that its nuclear weapons are no longer a subject of negotiation. Under these circumstances, the central issue is whether it is possible to move beyond "North Korea unclear reductionism. In other words, if the position that the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved first continues to be maintained, efforts to ease inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea tensions will inevitably struggle to even take the first step. If there is no viable short-term solution to the nuclear issue through negotiations, alternative pathways must be explored. These could include prioritizing progress toward a peace regime while maintaining a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula as a long-term objective. For such an approach to be viable, a consensus between South Korea and the United States on this matter will also be necessary.

Another challenge is that North Korea has refused not only dialogue or negotiation with South Korea but also any form of communication. The 600 millimeter multiple rocket launcher that North Korea test-fired around the time of the 9th Party Congress was clearly aimed at the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government has taken several preemptive and unilateral peace measures, including suspending the launch of anti–North Korea leaflets and halting loudspeaker broadcasts, in an effort to encourage a change in North Korea’s attitude. While it is certainly a positive outcome that North Korea has shown some limited response to these measures, this has yet to translate into a fundamental change in its hostile posture. In fact, North Korea has rarely entered negotiations simply because South Korea or the United States called for dialogue or adopted a conciliatory approach. More often, Pyongyang has initiated talks when it judged negotiations to be necessary for its own purposes. In other words, persuading North Korea to enter into dialogue requires altering the strategic landscape that shapes Pyongyang’s perception of the Korean Peninsula. To this end, first, it is important to carefully manage relations with China and Russia, the two countries on which North Korea’s external strategy is largely focused. Admittedly, given the current realities of North Korea’s relations with the two states, it would be very difficult to alter Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing and Moscow simply through managing South Korea’s relations with them. Yet, it is important to note that North Korea also harbors a certain degree of strategic mistrust toward both China and Russia. In an international environment increasingly characterized by each country pursuing its own interests, there is always the possibility that China or Russia may prioritize their national interests over those of North Korea. In this sense, the expansion of cooperation between South Korea and China, or between South Korea and Russia, and the resulting growth of shared interests could in itself raise doubts in Pyongyang. Second, issues such as “peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” and “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” should be elevated as shared regional concerns in East Asia. North Korea’s nuclear and strategic weapons programs risk provoking neighboring countries and undermining regional security, which means that these issues converge not only with the interests of the United States and Japan but also, to some extent, with those of China and Russia. In order to build a regional consensus that includes even North Korea’s traditional partners, China and Russia, it will be essential to pursue an inclusive foreign policy strategy that neither targets nor excludes any particular country. Such an inclusive approach is also important for South Korea as it seeks to secure its own survival in an international environment increasingly shaped by great-power politics. Domestic Challenges Within South Korean Society In democratic states, changes in government and policy resulting from periodic elections are to some extent inevitable. However, frequent shifts in foreign and North Korea policy can undermine confidence in the state. Even if inter-Korean relations improve and enter a phase of dialogue, meaningful progress in negotiations will be difficult if there is no trust in the sustainability of agreements. In other words, enhancing the consistency and stability of foreign and North Korea policy is essential. To achieve this, a minimum level of domestic consensus on the basic principles and direction of North Korea policy must be established within South Korean society. Unfortunately, one of the defining lines separating the so-called progressive and conservative political camps in South Korea is their respective stance toward North Korea policy. This division has become so deeply entrenched that it could be described not merely as “South-South conflict” but “South-South division.” Unless it is addressed, strengthening the credibility of South Korea’s policy toward North Korea will remain difficult. Another problem is the circulation of inaccurate information about North Korea, which contributes to political polarization in South Korea. In turn, this polarization further encourages the deliberate distortion of information and the spread of misinformation, creating a vicious circle. This pattern has emerged in large part because the ecosystem surrounding North Korea and inter-Korean affairs has eroded. As issues related to North Korea and unification have increasingly been treated as sensitive or highly politicized agendas, they have gradually moved further away from the sphere of ordinary public interest. Errors and distortions in information can only be corrected through the provision of accurate information. Restoring the ecosystem surrounding North Korea and inter-Korean relations is therefore essential. Concluding Remarks At present, the overlapping layers of conflict surrounding the Korean Peninsula are all operating in directions that run counter to peace, leaving the outlook for peace on the peninsula rather bleak. As the international environment moves toward intensified military competition and many of the strategic arms control regimes established after the Cold War are being dismantled one after another, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is unlikely to be an easy task. At a time when major powers are increasingly focused on pursuing their own national interests, it also seems unrealistic to expect cooperation on the Korean Peninsula issue alone. Under these circumstances, as North Korea reads the strategic landscape in this way and seeks to align with China and Russia to withstand pressure from the United States and the broader international community, it is difficult to expect meaningful inter-Korean cooperation to emerge. At the same time, amid deepening political polarization within South Korea, forging a consensus between progressive and conservative parties on North Korea policy appears almost as difficult as reaching agreements with North Korea itself. For this very reason, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is all the more precarious. The peninsula lies at the center of a region where not only the United States, China, and Russia but also North Korea possess nuclear weapons, yet there are no agreements or regimes governing strategic arms control. As wars in Europe and the Middle East have drawn global attention to the expansion of military arsenals, the Korean Peninsula stands out as a place where large quantities of weapons are concentrated. However, there is not even a minimal communication channel between the two Koreas to prevent accidental clashes. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is therefore in a more fragile state than at any time in recent memory. This is precisely why efforts to promote peace on the peninsula must not be abandoned, no matter how difficult the circumstances may be. The current structure of international political conflict differs from that of the Cold War era, when confrontation was defined primarily along ideological lines. Today, conflict and cooperation intersect, and the boundaries of conflict are often ambiguous or shift depending on the issue at hand. While the existence of a conflict structure remains the same, the very nature of it and the way it operates have changed. Moreover, the national power and international standing of South Korea have also changed significantly. Not only has the character of the structure evolved, but the capabilities of the actors involved have also transformed. This suggests that South Korea should avoid holding a peripheral mindset and play a more active role in trying to shape peace on the Korean Peninsula.

© 2026 Korean Sharing Movement. All rights reserved.

결의문

- 홍상영(우리민족서로돕기운동 사무총장) 통일부는 2026년 1월 16일, 「남북 간 작은 교역 재개를 위한 실질적 제도 기반 구축」 방안을 발표했다. 남북 간 민간 분야 교역의 재개와 점진적 활성화를 뒷받침하기 위해 관련 제도를 정비하겠다는 취지다.

How to Read North Korea Anew

A Head-On Breakthrough of the Sanctions Regime, the Two-State Strategy, and Hedging Diplomacy

By Professor Jung Chul Lee Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

With the new year underway, the DPRK remains at the center of public attention. More often than not, it is reduced to mere barroom chatter or framed as an object of anger and hate, and at other times, it draws a kind of sympathy, as that extended to a younger sibling who has run away from home. Perhaps, for this reason, a familiar sense persists that issues surrounding the DPRK are repeatedly misread. One might recall the DPRK’s scathing remarks toward the Moon administration, which culminated in the shocking blowing up of the liaison office, and its equally sharp response to the drone provocations under the Yoon administration. With that in mind, the DPRK’s “contribution” to the anti-martial law struggles, that is, its call to remain calm and silent, may even deserve a pat on the back. At the start of this year, Kim Yo Jong’s name resurfaced amid renewed attention to the drone incidents. But rather than parsing her remarks line by line, it feels more urgent to ask what actually lies beneath them. To move beyond barroom chatter and develop a more serious way of reading the DPRK, I propose three key keywords in the sections that follow. The ‘Hostile’ Two-State Theory and State-centered Discourses It is difficult to deny that the DPRK has abandoned unification, especially now that it has advanced a “hostile” two-state theory. Even so, a question remains: What should we make of the fact that Kim Jong Un’s two-state line has yet to be fully codified in the DPRK’s Constitution and the Rules of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP)? One interpretation is that the two-state strategy could emerge as a core agenda item at the 9th KWP Congress. Specifically, it may culminate in constitutional and party rule revisions that explicitly remove the concepts of nation and unification. In that case, the “hostile two-state” framework would likely harden into a more rigid political doctrine. Yet an alternative view is difficult to dismiss. Rather than treating the theory as a definitive abandonment of unification, some interpret it as a policy-level response: an “immediate” reaction to escalating tensions under the Yoon administration; an expression of “disappointment” with the Moon administration; or a “tactical” move to tighten alignment with China or Russia, and so on. This reading sustains a more hopeful expectation that shifts in geopolitical and policy conditions could eventually open space for a “peaceful” two-state framework. In addition, a meta-frame situates the DPRK’s two-state discourse within a global context marked by the retreat of globalization and the rise of state interventionism. From this perspective, the theory can be read as an effort to render the DPRK’s position more commensurable with the statist initiatives advanced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Given the extent to which the CCP has pushed this agenda in recent years, reading the DPRK’s line only through the familiar lenses of unification and nationhood discourse—while bracketing party–state dynamics—invites reflection on whether such analyses lean too heavily on a “we-centric” frame. Economic Collapse? Since the declaration of the “Frontal Breakthrough” in 2020, the DPRK has sought to rein in the market sphere dominated by the jangmadang (informal markets), hwagyo (Chinese residents/merchants), and the donju (quasi-private economic elites). In particular, their dependence on the Chinese market has been a source of concern among DPRK elites who have been wary of China’s hegemony. During the pandemic, the DPRK’s economy suffered under a “self-imposed lockdown.” Yet the leadership leveraged its monopoly over supply chains to constrain the jangmadang and moved decisively to consolidate control over distribution networks. As a result, five years on, the DPRK’s distribution networks have shifted from a dual structure of a state-run distribution system and non-state market (jangmadang) to a three-tier arrangement consisting of the state-run distribution system, the newly established “state market” network, and declining non-state markets. Because reliable information on the newly emerging “state-market” network remains scarce, prevailing assessments remain dependent on indicators (i.e., price data, supply conditions) that reflect the interests of jangmadang actors and stakeholders. However, with inflows to the jangmadang tightly constrained and the state actively cultivating substitute channels, the jangmadang is, in effect, a declining class. In this context, the informational gap surrounding the state-market network leaves us overly reliant on “market collapse” narratives, which have been amplified and exaggerated by the jangmadang interests. To be sure, jangmadang price and exchange-rate data remain indispensable for tracking livelihoods. However, as the alternative state-run market network is controlled by a state tightening its monopoly over trade, jangmadang-based indicators alone are no longer sufficient, highlighting the need for alternative forms of information. That brings us to a core principle of transitology, which demands properly tracking the crossover between declining forces and emerging ones. The Illusion of a “New Cold War” and North Korea’s Hedging Diplomacy Many have viewed the gathering of state leaders at China’s Victory Day commemorations as evidence of a tightening DPRK–China–Russia triangle, or even as a revival of the Cold War. However, a range of other variables complicate this interpretation and challenge the notion that the (new) Cold War is operating as a structural force in East Asia. In particular, there is limited reason to assume that this framing aligns with the DPRK’s own interests, particularly given its awareness that China itself has been reluctant to embrace such a narrative. This explains why the DPRK has framed the success of Victory Day diplomacy narrowly, focusing primarily on enhancing the prestige of the “supreme leader”. China recalibrates its DPRK policy chiefly in response to the U.S. administration, rendering relations with Pyongyang secondary in its diplomacy toward Washington. Aware that close ties with China do not automatically shape Beijing’s posture toward the U.S., the DPRK has thus maintained its diplomacy with China within the limits of a hedging strategy. DPRK–China relations remain a secondary consideration in China’s diplomacy toward the U.S., as Beijing recalibrates its DPRK policy in response to the U.S. administration. Recognizing that close ties with China do not automatically translate into the Chinese posture towards the U.S., the DPRK is unlikely to pursue diplomacy with China beyond a strategy of hedging. The same logic applies to DPRK–Russia relations. Some portray the current relationship as a “blood alliance,” yet its experience of abandonment during the Soviet era remains deeply etched in its memory. Claims that Moscow will sideline the DPRK once the war in Ukraine ends, or that Russian compensation has fallen short of North Korean expectations, often reduce the relationship to a story of one-sided courtship. Such readings, however, reflect a limited understanding of the diplomatic instincts of the DPRK elite. For DPRK, engagement with Russia is unlikely to resemble a “bandwagoning” alliance in which autonomy is traded for security, as in the case of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Instead, North Korea’s engagement with Russia largely remains within the bounds of hedging diplomacy. The DPRK’s orchestration of consecutive summits with Russia and China, followed by the 2019 DPRK–U.S. meeting at Panmunjom, has been viewed as an unprecedented form of hedging diplomacy. Hedging by a weaker state is often diluted once major powers align their interests. Yet the DPRK has remained steadfast in its commitment to hedging, despite repeated historical reversals. Indeed, it is difficult to deny that DPRK is now pursuing a more assertive approach toward major powers, drawing on the comparative advantages it has preserved under its “military-first” line—most notably asymmetric capabilities such as nuclear powers, alongside conventional strength. In other words, whereas the DPRK’s earlier great-power diplomacy largely amounted to hedging between China and Russia in the 1960s, it has evolved into a broader strategy oriented simultaneously toward the U.S., China, and Russia. For a small state, sustaining such a hedging posture is extraordinarily demanding. Nonetheless, the DPRK appears increasingly confident in this approach, underpinned by its nuclear capabilities. In this context, if we remain wedded to the assumption that the DPRK is simply a failed state, it becomes difficult to fully grasp its current posture, including its readiness to rebuff President Trump’s overtures. Conclusion In many respects, the DPRK’s diplomatic autonomy represents a “devil’s gift,” underwritten by authoritarian governance, the systematic co-optation of the poor, and the strategic leverage conferred by its nuclear arsenal. The term “devilish” is used here to underscore the moral costs and coercive nature of these means. Yet in the contemporary global order, the DPRK’s diplomacy is beginning to exert greater real-world influence than it did in the past. This helps explain why a growing number of observers no longer view the DPRK as a state preoccupied solely with survivability, but instead interpret it as a revisionist state intent on challenging the status quo. We have entered a period in which it is increasingly difficult to understand the DPRK if we remain confined to the habitual frame of seeing it only as a failed state—or if we continue to approach it through the worn lenses of nationalist discourse and patronizing perspectives. In this sense, it may be worth considering that the problem lies not only in the pathway taken by the DPRK, but also in our own inertial assumptions and interpretive habits.

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