[Peace & Sharing Newsletter] How To Read North Korea Anew (Feb 2026)

How to Read North Korea Anew

A Head-On Breakthrough of the Sanctions Regime, the Two-State Strategy, and Hedging Diplomacy

By Professor Jung Chul Lee
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

With the new year underway, the DPRK remains at the center of public attention. More often than not, it is reduced to mere barroom chatter or framed as an object of anger and hate, and at other times, it draws a kind of sympathy, as that extended to a younger sibling who has run away from home. Perhaps, for this reason, a familiar sense persists that issues surrounding the DPRK are repeatedly misread. One might recall the DPRK’s scathing remarks toward the Moon administration, which culminated in the shocking blowing up of the liaison office, and its equally sharp response to the drone provocations under the Yoon administration. With that in mind, the DPRK’s “contribution” to the anti-martial law struggles, that is, its call to remain calm and silent, may even deserve a pat on the back. At the start of this year, Kim Yo Jong’s name resurfaced amid renewed attention to the drone incidents. But rather than parsing her remarks line by line, it feels more urgent to ask what actually lies beneath them. To move beyond barroom chatter and develop a more serious way of reading the DPRK, I propose three key keywords in the sections that follow.


The ‘Hostile’ Two-State Theory and State-centered Discourses

It is difficult to deny that the DPRK has abandoned unification, especially now that it has advanced a “hostile” two-state theory. Even so, a question remains: What should we make of the fact that Kim Jong Un’s two-state line has yet to be fully codified in the DPRK’s Constitution and the Rules of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP)?

One interpretation is that the two-state strategy could emerge as a core agenda item at the 9th KWP Congress. Specifically, it may culminate in constitutional and party rule revisions that explicitly remove the concepts of nation and unification. In that case, the “hostile two-state” framework would likely harden into a more rigid political doctrine.

Yet an alternative view is difficult to dismiss. Rather than treating the theory as a definitive abandonment of unification, some interpret it as a policy-level response: an “immediate” reaction to escalating tensions under the Yoon administration; an expression of “disappointment” with the Moon administration; or a “tactical” move to tighten alignment with China or Russia, and so on. This reading sustains a more hopeful expectation that shifts in geopolitical and policy conditions could eventually open space for a “peaceful” two-state framework.

In addition, a meta-frame situates the DPRK’s two-state discourse within a global context marked by the retreat of globalization and the rise of state interventionism. From this perspective, the theory can be read as an effort to render the DPRK’s position more commensurable with the statist initiatives advanced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Given the extent to which the CCP has pushed this agenda in recent years, reading the DPRK’s line only through the familiar lenses of unification and nationhood discourse—while bracketing party–state dynamics—invites reflection on whether such analyses lean too heavily on a “we-centric” frame.


Economic Collapse?

Since the declaration of the “Frontal Breakthrough” in 2020, the DPRK has sought to rein in the market sphere dominated by the jangmadang (informal markets), hwagyo (Chinese residents/merchants), and the donju (quasi-private economic elites). In particular, their dependence on the Chinese market has been a source of concern among DPRK elites who have been wary of China’s hegemony.

During the pandemic, the DPRK’s economy suffered under a “self-imposed lockdown.” Yet the leadership leveraged its monopoly over supply chains to constrain the jangmadang and moved decisively to consolidate control over distribution networks. As a result, five years on, the DPRK’s distribution networks have shifted from a dual structure of a state-run distribution system and non-state market (jangmadang) to a three-tier arrangement consisting of the state-run distribution system, the newly established “state market” network, and declining non-state markets.

Because reliable information on the newly emerging “state-market” network remains scarce, prevailing assessments remain dependent on indicators (i.e., price data, supply conditions) that reflect the interests of jangmadang actors and stakeholders. However, with inflows to the jangmadang tightly constrained and the state actively cultivating substitute channels, the jangmadang is, in effect, a declining class. In this context, the informational gap surrounding the state-market network leaves us overly reliant on “market collapse” narratives, which have been amplified and exaggerated by the jangmadang interests. To be sure, jangmadang price and exchange-rate data remain indispensable for tracking livelihoods. However, as the alternative state-run market network is controlled by a state tightening its monopoly over trade, jangmadang-based indicators alone are no longer sufficient, highlighting the need for alternative forms of information. That brings us to a core principle of transitology, which demands properly tracking the crossover between declining forces and emerging ones.

The Illusion of a “New Cold War” and North Korea’s Hedging Diplomacy

Many have viewed the gathering of state leaders at China’s Victory Day commemorations as evidence of a tightening DPRK–China–Russia triangle, or even as a revival of the Cold War. However, a range of other variables complicate this interpretation and challenge the notion that the (new) Cold War is operating as a structural force in East Asia. In particular, there is limited reason to assume that this framing aligns with the DPRK’s own interests, particularly given its awareness that China itself has been reluctant to embrace such a narrative. This explains why the DPRK has framed the success of Victory Day diplomacy narrowly, focusing primarily on enhancing the prestige of the “supreme leader”. China recalibrates its DPRK policy chiefly in response to the U.S. administration, rendering relations with Pyongyang secondary in its diplomacy toward Washington. Aware that close ties with China do not automatically shape Beijing’s posture toward the U.S., the DPRK has thus maintained its diplomacy with China within the limits of a hedging strategy.

DPRK–China relations remain a secondary consideration in China’s diplomacy toward the U.S., as Beijing recalibrates its DPRK policy in response to the U.S. administration. Recognizing that close ties with China do not automatically translate into the Chinese posture towards the U.S., the DPRK is unlikely to pursue diplomacy with China beyond a strategy of hedging.

The same logic applies to DPRK–Russia relations. Some portray the current relationship as a “blood alliance,” yet its experience of abandonment during the Soviet era remains deeply etched in its memory. Claims that Moscow will sideline the DPRK once the war in Ukraine ends, or that Russian compensation has fallen short of North Korean expectations, often reduce the relationship to a story of one-sided courtship. Such readings, however, reflect a limited understanding of the diplomatic instincts of the DPRK elite. For DPRK, engagement with Russia is unlikely to resemble a “bandwagoning” alliance in which autonomy is traded for security, as in the case of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Instead, North Korea’s engagement with Russia largely remains within the bounds of hedging diplomacy.

The DPRK’s orchestration of consecutive summits with Russia and China, followed by the 2019 DPRK–U.S. meeting at Panmunjom, has been viewed as an unprecedented form of hedging diplomacy. Hedging by a weaker state is often diluted once major powers align their interests. Yet the DPRK has remained steadfast in its commitment to hedging, despite repeated historical reversals. Indeed, it is difficult to deny that DPRK is now pursuing a more assertive approach toward major powers, drawing on the comparative advantages it has preserved under its “military-first” line—most notably asymmetric capabilities such as nuclear powers, alongside conventional strength. In other words, whereas the DPRK’s earlier great-power diplomacy largely amounted to hedging between China and Russia in the 1960s, it has evolved into a broader strategy oriented simultaneously toward the U.S., China, and Russia. For a small state, sustaining such a hedging posture is extraordinarily demanding. Nonetheless, the DPRK appears increasingly confident in this approach, underpinned by its nuclear capabilities. In this context, if we remain wedded to the assumption that the DPRK is simply a failed state, it becomes difficult to fully grasp its current posture, including its readiness to rebuff President Trump’s overtures.

Conclusion

In many respects, the DPRK’s diplomatic autonomy represents a “devil’s gift,” underwritten by authoritarian governance, the systematic co-optation of the poor, and the strategic leverage conferred by its nuclear arsenal. The term “devilish” is used here to underscore the moral costs and coercive nature of these means. Yet in the contemporary global order, the DPRK’s diplomacy is beginning to exert greater real-world influence than it did in the past. This helps explain why a growing number of observers no longer view the DPRK as a state preoccupied solely with survivability, but instead interpret it as a revisionist state intent on challenging the status quo. We have entered a period in which it is increasingly difficult to understand the DPRK if we remain confined to the habitual frame of seeing it only as a failed state—or if we continue to approach it through the worn lenses of nationalist discourse and patronizing perspectives. In this sense, it may be worth considering that the problem lies not only in the pathway taken by the DPRK, but also in our own inertial assumptions and interpretive habits.

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